160668-9

(1) whether the defendant’s retrial in Docket No. 2016-000309-FH was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the federal or state constitutions, US Const, Am V; Const 1963, art 1, § 15;

(2) if so, whether vacating his convictions in that case would also warrant a new trial, resentencing, or any other remedy in the jointly tried case, Docket No. 2017-001376-FC; and

(3) whether the trial court improperly imposed a mandatory minimum sentence of 25 years for an act of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (Count II) that was not charged as carrying such a minimum. See Alleyne v United States, 570 US 99, 109-111 (2013); Apprendi v New Jersey, 530 US 466, 476, 478-479 (2000).

161324

(1) whether the defendant was denied his constitutional right to present a defense by the exclusion of expert testimony that the complainant suffered from Reactive Attachment Disorder (RAD); and

(2) whether the defendant was denied a fair trial by the prosecutor’s cross-examination of Albert Meshkin insinuating that the defendant had sexually assaulted his sister or sister-in-law, see People v Whitfield, 425 Mich 116, 128-134 (1986), and People v Dorrikas, 354 Mich 303 (1958).

161396

(1) whether he was denied his right to a public trial pursuant to US Const, Am VI, and Const 1963, art 1, § 20 where the Genesee Circuit Court stated that it was barring everyone, but the decedent’s mother, from the courtroom for the remainder of the trial and told others in the courtroom to leave and not return;

(2) whether, despite the court’s statement, the courtroom remained open to the public because the courtroom door was unlocked, no sign was posted advising members of the public that the courtroom was closed, and court personnel did not prevent persons from entering the courtroom;

(3) whether the appellant waived his right to a public trial;

(4) whether trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to object; see Weaver v Massachusetts, 582 US ___; 137 S Ct 1899, 1913 (2017); and

(5) whether the trial court committed plain error entitling the appellant to a new trial.

161529

(1) whether the defendant’s successive motion for relief from judgment is “based on a retroactive change in the law,” MCR 6.502(G)(2), where the law relied upon does not automatically entitle him to relief;

and

(2) if so, whether the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460 (2012), and Montgomery v Louisiana, 577 US 190 (2016) should be applied to defendants who are over 17 years old at the time they commit a crime and who are convicted of murder and sentenced to mandatory life without parole, under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution or Const 1963, art 1, § 16, or both.

162086

Whether the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460 (2012), and Montgomery v Louisiana, 577 US 190 (2016), should be applied to defendants who are over 17 years old at the time they commit a crime and who are convicted of murder and sentenced to mandatory life without parole, under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution or Const 1963, art 1, § 16, or both.

162425

(1) whether the defendant’s parolable life sentences for second-degree murder were the result of an illusory plea bargain;

(2) whether the defendant’s sentences violate the prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishments” found in the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and/or the prohibition against “cruel or unusual punishment” found in Const 1963, art 1, § 16, where he was under the age of 18 at the time of the offenses;

(3) whether the Parole Board’s “life means life” policy renders the defendant’s sentences unconstitutional under Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460 (2012), and Montgomery v Louisiana, 577 US 190 (2016);

(4) whether, pursuant to Miller and Montgomery, the trial court was required to take the defendant’s youth into consideration when accepting his plea and ruling on his motion for relief from judgment; and

(5) whether the Parole Board is similarly required to take his youth into consideration when evaluating him for release on parole.

162497

(1) whether the statement the appellant made to the police was not voluntary because the interrogating officers employed overly coercive tactics, including promises of leniency. People v Conte, 421 Mich 704 (1984), see also People v Shipley, 256 Mich App 367, 373 (2003);

(2) whether the requirement in MCL 769.34(10) that the Court of Appeals affirm any sentence within the guidelines range, absent a scoring error or reliance on inaccurate information, is consistent with the Sixth Amendment, the due-process right to appellate review, and People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358 (2015); and, if not,

(3) whether the appellant’s sentence is reasonable and proportionate.

162211

(1) whether the administrative logs documenting the routine inspection of the DataMaster machine used to determine the appellant’s alcohol level, see Mich Admin Code R 325.2653(3), are testimonial and thus inadmissible under the Confrontation Clauses, US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20; see Crawford v Washington, 541 US 36 (2004); Melendez-Diaz v Massachusetts, 557 US 305 (2009); Bullcoming v New Mexico, 564 US 647 (2011); Williams v Illinois, 567 US 50 (2012); and People v Nunley, 491 Mich 686 (2012); and

(2) whether the logs are admissible pursuant to MRE 803(6), the business records exception to the hearsay rule.

162373

(1) whether the appellant was denied his right to due process when witness T. B. was allowed to identify him at trial, or denied the effective assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to object to the witness’ in-court identification testimony;

(2) whether the requirement in MCL 769.34(10) that the Court of Appeals affirm any sentence within the guidelines range, absent a scoring error or reliance on inaccurate information, is consistent with the Sixth Amendment, the due-process right to appellate review, and People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358 (2015); and, if not,

(3) whether the appellant’s sentence is reasonable and proportionate.

153828

On the Court’s own motion, the motion for reconsideration of this Court’s March 9, 2018 order
is again considered, and it is GRANTED with respect to the defendant’s double jeopardy
issue.

156180

(1) whether the defendant’s convictions under MCL 750.82 and MCL 750.84 violate double jeopardy;

(2) whether MCL 750.82 and MCL 750.84 contain contradictory and mutually exclusive provisions such that the Legislature did not intend a defendant to be convicted of both crimes for the same conduct, compare People v Miller, 498 Mich 13, 18-26 (2015) with People v Doss, 406 Mich 90, 96-99 (1979);

(3) whether the Court of Appeals in People v Davis, 320 Mich App 484 (2017), erred in recognizing a rule against mutually exclusive verdicts in Michigan, see generally United States v Powell, 469 US 57, 69 n 8 (1984); State v Davis, 466 SW3d 49 (Tenn, 2015); and

(4) whether that rule is applicable to the facts of this case.

160668-9

(1) whether the defendant’s retrial in Docket No. 2016-000309-FH was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the federal or state constitutions, US Const, Am V; Const 1963, art 1, § 15;

(2) if so, whether vacating his convictions in that case would also warrant a new trial, resentencing, or any other remedy in the jointly tried case, Docket No. 2017-001376-FC; and

(3) whether the trial court improperly imposed a mandatory minimum sentence of 25 years for an act of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (Count II) that was not charged as carrying such a minimum. See Alleyne v United States, 570 US 99, 109-111 (2013); Apprendi v New Jersey, 530 US 466, 476, 478-479 (2000).

160775

(1) whether the defendant’s convictions under MCL 750.81a(3) and MCL 750.84 violate constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy, see People v Miller, 498 Mich 13 (2015); and

(2) if so, whether the defendant is entitled to relief. See People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763 (1999).

157581, 157646

Whether the trial court erred in failing to grant the appellants’ motion for a mistrial because their substantial rights were impaired by the admission of a codefendant’s statement to the police. See Zafiro v United States, 506 US 534, 539 (1993), and People v Hana, 447 Mich 325, 345-346 (1994).

162354-5, 162374

Whether the lower courts erred by holding that the suppressed October 16, 2007 interview transcript was not material to their guilt such that they were not entitled to relief under Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83, 87 (1963), and People v Chenault, 495 Mich 142, 149-150, 155 (2014).

Additionally, appellant Hinton shall address his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

162373

(1) whether the appellant was denied his right to due process when witness T. B. was allowed to identify him at trial, or denied the effective assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to object to the witness’ in-court identification testimony;

(2) whether the requirement in MCL 769.34(10) that the Court of Appeals affirm any sentence within the guidelines range, absent a scoring error or reliance on inaccurate information, is consistent with the Sixth Amendment, the due-process right to appellate review, and People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358 (2015); and, if not,

(3) whether the appellant’s sentence is reasonable and proportionate.

160551

(1) whether the Court of Appeals correctly applied People v Kennedy, 502 Mich 206 (2018), when it affirmed the trial court’s decision to deny the defendant’s motion for expert funding; and

(2) whether the Court of Appeals correctly held that evidence of other acts of domestic violence is admissible under MCL 768.27b regardless of whether it might be otherwise inadmissible under the hearsay rules of evidence.

161092

(1) whether the defendant was denied a fair trial by virtue of the trial judge’s instructions to the jury regarding reasonable doubt;

(2) whether trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to object to the trial judge’s instructions on reasonable doubt; and

(3) whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction of felony-murder.

161324

(1) whether the defendant was denied his constitutional right to present a defense by the exclusion of expert testimony that the complainant suffered from Reactive Attachment Disorder (RAD); and

(2) whether the defendant was denied a fair trial by the prosecutor’s cross-examination of Albert Meshkin insinuating that the defendant had sexually assaulted his sister or sister-in-law, see People v Whitfield, 425 Mich 116, 128-134 (1986), and People v Dorrikas, 354 Mich 303 (1958).

162211

(1) whether the administrative logs documenting the routine inspection of the DataMaster machine used to determine the appellant’s alcohol level, see Mich Admin Code R 325.2653(3), are testimonial and thus inadmissible under the Confrontation Clauses, US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20; see Crawford v Washington, 541 US 36 (2004); Melendez-Diaz v Massachusetts, 557 US 305 (2009); Bullcoming v New Mexico, 564 US 647 (2011); Williams v Illinois, 567 US 50 (2012); and People v Nunley, 491 Mich 686 (2012); and

(2) whether the logs are admissible pursuant to MRE 803(6), the business records exception to the hearsay rule.

162497

(1) whether the statement the appellant made to the police was not voluntary because the interrogating officers employed overly coercive tactics, including promises of leniency. People v Conte, 421 Mich 704 (1984), see also People v Shipley, 256 Mich App 367, 373 (2003);

(2) whether the requirement in MCL 769.34(10) that the Court of Appeals affirm any sentence within the guidelines range, absent a scoring error or reliance on inaccurate information, is consistent with the Sixth Amendment, the due-process right to appellate review, and People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358 (2015); and, if not,

(3) whether the appellant’s sentence is reasonable and proportionate.

160551

(1) whether the Court of Appeals correctly applied People v Kennedy, 502 Mich 206 (2018), when it affirmed the trial court’s decision to deny the defendant’s motion for expert funding; and

(2) whether the Court of Appeals correctly held that evidence of other acts of domestic violence is admissible under MCL 768.27b regardless of whether it might be otherwise inadmissible under the hearsay rules of evidence.

162425

(1) whether the defendant’s parolable life sentences for second-degree murder were the result of an illusory plea bargain;

(2) whether the defendant’s sentences violate the prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishments” found in the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and/or the prohibition against “cruel or unusual punishment” found in Const 1963, art 1, § 16, where he was under the age of 18 at the time of the offenses;

(3) whether the Parole Board’s “life means life” policy renders the defendant’s sentences unconstitutional under Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460 (2012), and Montgomery v Louisiana, 577 US 190 (2016);

(4) whether, pursuant to Miller and Montgomery, the trial court was required to take the defendant’s youth into consideration when accepting his plea and ruling on his motion for relief from judgment; and

(5) whether the Parole Board is similarly required to take his youth into consideration when evaluating him for release on parole.

161092

(1) whether the defendant was denied a fair trial by virtue of the trial judge’s instructions to the jury regarding reasonable doubt;

(2) whether trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to object to the trial judge’s instructions on
reasonable doubt; and

(3) whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction of felony-murder.

161396

(1) whether he was denied his right to a public trial pursuant to US Const, Am VI, and Const 1963, art 1, § 20 where the Genesee Circuit Court stated that it was barring everyone, but the decedent’s mother, from the courtroom for the remainder of the trial and told others in the courtroom to leave and not return;

(2) whether, despite the court’s statement, the courtroom remained open to the public because the courtroom door was unlocked, no sign was posted advising members of the public that the courtroom was closed, and court personnel did not prevent persons from entering the courtroom;

(3) whether the appellant waived his right to a public trial;

(4) whether trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to object; see Weaver v Massachusetts, 582 US ___; 137 S Ct 1899, 1913 (2017); and

(5) whether the trial court committed plain error entitling the appellant to a new trial.

161723

Whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for trial defense counsel’s failure to investigate and present Michael Hudson’s testimony, the outcome of this trial would have been different. Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 694 (1984).

161797, 161805

Whether the common law affirmative defense of defense of others may be raised as a defense to the felony and misdemeanor charges against them, see People v Dupree, 486 Mich 693 (2010); People v Triplett, 499 Mich 52 (2016), and

whether trial defense counsels’ failure to request such an instruction deprived the defendants of the effective assistance of counsel, see Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668 (1984).

162374

Whether the lower courts erred by holding that the suppressed October 16, 2007 interview transcript was not material to their guilt such that they were not entitled to relief under Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83, 87 (1963), and People v Chenault, 495 Mich 142, 149-150, 155 (2014).

Additionally, appellant Hinton shall address his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

162373

(1) whether the appellant was denied his right to due process when witness T. B. was allowed to identify him at trial, or denied the effective assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to object to the witness’ in-court identification testimony;

(2) whether the requirement in MCL 769.34(10) that the Court of Appeals affirm any sentence within the guidelines range, absent a scoring error or reliance on inaccurate information, is consistent with the Sixth Amendment, the due-process right to appellate review, and People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358 (2015); and, if not,

(3) whether the appellant’s sentence is reasonable and proportionate.

161092

(1) whether the defendant was denied a fair trial by virtue of the trial judge’s instructions to the jury regarding reasonable doubt;

(2) whether trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to object to the trial judge’s instructions on
reasonable doubt; and

(3) whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction of felony-murder.

154994

(1) which party, if any, bears the burden of proof of showing that a Miller factor does or does not suggest a LWOP sentence;

(2) whether the sentencing court gave proper consideration to the defendant’s “chronological age and its hallmark features,” Miller, 567 US at 477-478, by focusing on his proximity to the bright line age of 18 rather than his individual characteristics; and

(3) whether the court properly considered the defendant’s family and home environment, which the court characterized as “far from optimal,” as weighing against his potential for rehabilitation.

157738

(1) whether the Court of Appeals correctly held in People v Wines, 323 Mich App 343 (2018), rev’d in nonrelevant part 506 Mich 954 (2020), that trial courts must consider the distinctive attributes of youth, such as those discussed in Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460 (2012), when sentencing a minor to a term of years pursuant to MCL 769.25a;

(2) if Wines was correctly decided, whether sentencing judges have an obligation to explicitly set forth their analysis of how the defendant’s age impacted their sentencing discretion when proceeding under MCL 769.25a or MCL 769.25; and

(3) if Wines applies to this case, whether the trial court complied with its requirements, and if it did not, what more the court was required to do.

158695

(1) whether the Court of Appeals correctly held in People v Wines, 323 Mich App 343 (2018), rev’d in nonrelevant part 506 Mich 954 (2020), that trial courts must consider the distinctive attributes of youth, such as those discussed in Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460 (2012), when sentencing a minor to a term of years pursuant to MCL 769.25a;

(2) if Wines was correctly decided, whether sentencing judges have an obligation to explicitly set forth their analysis of how the defendant’s age impacted their sentencing discretion when proceeding under MCL 769.25a or MCL 769.25; and

(3) if Wines applies to this case, whether the trial court complied with its requirements, and if it did not, what more the court was required to do.

161529

(1) whether the defendant’s successive motion for relief from judgment is “based on a retroactive change in the law, MCR 6.502(G)(2), where the law relied upon does not automatically entitle him to relief;

and

(2) if so, whether the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460 (2012), and Montgomery v Louisiana, 577 US 190 (2016) should be applied to defendants who are over 17 years old at the time they commit a crime and who are convicted of murder and sentenced to mandatory life without parole, under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution or Const 1963, art 1, § 16, or both.

162086

Whether the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460 (2012), and Montgomery v Louisiana, 577 US 190 (2016), should be applied to defendants who are over 17 years old at the time they commit a crime and who are convicted of murder and sentenced to mandatory life without parole, under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution or Const 1963, art 1, § 16, or both.

162425

(1) whether the defendant’s parolable life sentences for second-degree murder were the result of an illusory plea bargain;

(2) whether the defendant’s sentences violate the prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishments” found in the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and/or the prohibition against “cruel or unusual punishment” found in Const 1963, art 1, § 16, where he was under the age of 18 at the time of the offenses;

(3) whether the Parole Board’s “life means life” policy renders the defendant’s sentences unconstitutional under Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460 (2012), and Montgomery v Louisiana, 577 US 190 (2016);

(4) whether, pursuant to Miller and Montgomery, the trial court was required to take the defendant’s youth into consideration when accepting his plea and ruling on his motion for relief from judgment; and

(5) whether the Parole Board is similarly required to take his youth into consideration when evaluating him for release on parole.

161324

(1) whether the defendant was denied his constitutional right to present a defense by the exclusion of expert testimony that the complainant suffered from Reactive Attachment Disorder (RAD); and

(2) whether the defendant was denied a fair trial by the prosecutor’s cross-examination of Albert Meshkin insinuating that the defendant had sexually assaulted his sister or sister-in-law, see People v Whitfield, 425 Mich 116, 128-134 (1986), and People v Dorrikas, 354 Mich 303 (1958).

160668-9

(1) whether the defendant’s retrial in Docket No. 2016-000309-FH was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the federal or state constitutions, US Const, Am V; Const 1963, art 1, § 15;

(2) if so, whether vacating his convictions in that case would also warrant a new trial, resentencing, or any other remedy in the jointly tried case, Docket No. 2017-001376-FC; and

(3) whether the trial court improperly imposed a mandatory minimum sentence of 25 years for an act of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (Count II) that was not charged as carrying such a minimum. See Alleyne v United States, 570 US 99, 109-111 (2013); Apprendi v New Jersey, 530 US 466, 476, 478-479 (2000).

162221

(1) whether attempted violation of MCL 800.283a necessarily requires a score of 25 points for Offense Variable (OV) 19; and if not,

(2) whether there is sufficient evidence to score OV 19 at 25 points on this record.

162373

(1) whether the appellant was denied his right to due process when witness T. B. was allowed to identify him at trial, or denied the effective assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to object to the witness’ in-court identification testimony;

(2) whether the requirement in MCL 769.34(10) that the Court of Appeals affirm any sentence within the guidelines range, absent a scoring error or reliance on inaccurate information, is consistent with the Sixth Amendment, the due-process right to appellate review, and People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358 (2015); and, if not,

(3) whether the appellant’s sentence is reasonable and proportionate.

162497

(1) whether the statement the appellant made to the police was not voluntary because the interrogating officers employed overly coercive tactics, including promises of leniency. People v Conte, 421 Mich 704 (1984), see also People v Shipley, 256 Mich App 367, 373 (2003);

(2) whether the requirement in MCL 769.34(10) that the Court of Appeals affirm any sentence within the guidelines range, absent a scoring error or reliance on inaccurate information, is consistent with the Sixth Amendment, the due-process right to appellate review, and People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358 (2015); and, if not,

(3) whether the appellant’s sentence is reasonable and proportionate.

162869

Whether the Oakland Circuit Court erred in assigning 10 points to Offense Variable 9, MCL 777.39(1)(c), for placing 2 to 9 individuals in danger of physical injury or death.

162908

Whether the trial court’s scoring of Offense Variable 1 at 15 points for pointing a firearm at the victim or touching the victim with a firearm was improper in light of the jury verdict acquitting the appellant of felon-in-possession and felony-firearm charges. See People v Beck, 504 Mich 605 (2019).

156180

(1) whether the defendant’s convictions under MCL 750.82 and MCL 750.84 violate double jeopardy;

(2) whether MCL 750.82 and MCL 750.84 contain contradictory and mutually exclusive provisions such that the Legislature did not intend a defendant to be convicted of both crimes for the same conduct, compare People v Miller, 498 Mich 13, 18-26 (2015) with People v Doss, 406 Mich 90, 96-99 (1979);

(3) whether the Court of Appeals in People v Davis, 320 Mich App 484 (2017), erred in recognizing a rule against mutually exclusive verdicts in Michigan, see generally United States v Powell, 469 US 57, 69 n 8 (1984); State v Davis, 466 SW3d 49 (Tenn, 2015); and

(4) whether that rule is applicable to the facts of this case.

162208

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding on remand that the defendant and the complainant are effectively related by blood for purposes of MCL 750.520d(1)(d), such that there was an adequate factual basis for the defendant’s no-contest plea.

162136

(1) whether the criminal act of the principal can, for purposes of venue, be attributed to an alleged aider and abettor who is being “prosecuted, indicted, [and] tried . . . as if he had directly committed the offense,” MCL 767.39; and

(2) whether it is relevant for the purpose of establishing venue in this prosecution for delivery of a controlled substance causing death, MCL 760.317a that the appellant delivered the controlled substance in Macomb County and there is no evidence that the appellant knew that the person to whom he delivered the controlled substance had moved from Macomb County to Livingston County, see MCL 762.8; People v McBurrows, 504 Mich 308 (2019).

162327

(1) whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the trial court’s failure to comply with the requirements of People v Anderson, 398 Mich 361 (1976) and MCR 6.005(D) did not warrant reversal; and

(2) whether the standard of review for unpreserved constitutional errors set forth in People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 764 (1999), should apply where a criminal defendant argues on appeal that his waiver of counsel was invalid.

160958-9

(1) whether fingerprinting constitutes a search for Fourth Amendment purposes;

(2) if it does, whether fingerprinting based on no more than a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, as authorized by the Grand Rapids Police Department’s “photograph and print” procedures, is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment; and

(3) whether fingerprinting exceeds the scope of a permissible seizure pursuant to Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1 (1968).

162482

Whether the prohibition on discrimination “because of . . . sex” in the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA), MCL 37.2101 et seq., applies to discrimination based on sexual orientation.

162537-8

Whether the appellees violated either MCL 37.1502 or MCL 37.1506a of the Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.1101, et seq., by denying the appellants’ request to install a railing on the front stoop of their condominium.

156150

(1) whether the two-part analysis applied by the Court of Appeals is consistent with District of Columbia v Heller, 554 US 570 (2008), and McDonald v Chicago, 561 US 742 (2010), cf. Rogers v Grewal, 140 S Ct 1865, 1867 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting);

(2) if so, whether intermediate or strict judicial scrutiny applies in this case; and

(3) whether the University of Michigan’s firearm policy is violative of the Second Amendment, considering among other factors whether this policy reflects historical or traditional firearm restrictions within a university setting and whether it is relevant to consider this policy in light of the University’s geographic breadth within the city of Ann Arbor.

160958-9

(1) whether fingerprinting constitutes a search for Fourth Amendment purposes;

(2) if it does, whether fingerprinting based on no more than a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, as authorized by the Grand Rapids Police Department’s “photograph and print” procedures, is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment; and

(3) whether fingerprinting exceeds the scope of a permissible seizure pursuant to Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1 (1968).

162434-5

(1) whether MCL 700.5204(2)(b) is unconstitutional because it does not allow for a presumption that a fit parent’s decision is in the best interest of the child, see Troxel v Granville, 530 US 57 (2000); and

(2) whether the Muskegon Probate Court erred by granting the petitioner guardianship in this case.

160186

(1) whether the Court of Appeals properly held that the plaintiff Counties are successors in interest to their respective road commissions, which were dissolved pursuant to MCL 46.1 et seq., and MCL 224.1 et seq.;

(2) whether the Court of Appeals properly held that plaintiff Jackson County was a member of defendant Michigan County Road Commission Self-Insurance Pool (Pool) despite having dissolved its road commission; and

(3) whether the Court of Appeals properly held that the plaintiff Counties are entitled to refunds of surplus premiums paid to the Pool because the forfeiture provisions in the defendant Pool’s governing documents, which comprise the parties’ binding contractual agreement, are unenforceable as against public policy and must be severed, and whether this issue was properly preserved by the plaintiff Counties.

161628, 161650

Whether the appellees’ claims for no-fault personal protection insurance benefits are barred by (1) res judicata or (2) collateral estoppel. See Adair v Michigan, 470 Mich 105, 121 (2004); Monat v State Farm Ins Co, 469 Mich 679, 682-684 & n 2 (2004)

161865

Whether [appellant’s] declaration that a homeowners insurance policy was void ab initio should be considered a denial of a claim under the policy such that it may invoke its right to subrogation when it was required by a standard mortgage clause to pay the balance of the appellee’s mortgage.

161911

(1) whether the appellant’s underlying complaint in its action against the insureds is a “written instrument” under MCR 2.113(C)(1) (formerly MCR 2.113(F)(1)), a “pertinent part” of a written instrument under MCR 2.113(C)(1), or is otherwise part of “the pleadings” in this case such that the lower courts could properly consider it in the MCR 2.116(C)(8) analysis;

(2) whether the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the appellant’s pleadings showed the insureds knowingly provided alcohol to minors and that this knowing act was a proximate cause of the appellant’s damages;

(3) whether pleading proximate causation is the equivalent of pleading that an act “created a direct risk of harm from which the consequences should reasonably have been expected by the insured,” Allstate Ins Co v McCarn, 466 Mich 277, 283 (2002); and

(4) whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Macomb Circuit Court’s grant of summary disposition to appellee State Farm under MCR 2.116(C)(8). See Frankenmuth Mut Ins Co v Masters, 460 Mich 105 (1999); Nabozny v Burkhardt, 461 Mich 471 (2000); Allstate, supra.

162419

(1) whether a lower-priority insurer, who was provided timely notice under MCL 500.3145(1), can be held liable for personal protection insurance benefits under the no-fault act if the higher-priority insurer was not identified until after the one-year statutory notice period under MCL 500.3145(1) expired; if so,

(2) whether the insured must prove that he or she exercised reasonable, due, or some other degree of, diligence in searching for the higher-priority insurer; and, if so,

(3) whether the appellant exercised the requisite degree of diligence in searching for the higher-priority insurer.

161454

(1) whether, with respect to Covisint Corporation’s cash-out merger with OpenText Corporation, corporate officers and directors owed cognizable common law fiduciary duties to the corporation’s shareholders independent of any statutory duty; and

(2) whether the appellant has standing to bring a direct cause of action under either the common law or MCL 450.1541a.

162507-8

Whether the Court of Appeals correctly held that the trial court was not authorized, under MCR 2.311(A), to permit video recording of the neuropsychological examination.

161262

(1) whether the mediator’s failure to perform the domestic violence screening as required by MCL 600.1035(2) and (3) and MCR 3.216(H)(2) should be reviewed for harmless error;

(2) if so, whether such an error here was harmless; and

(3) whether the trial court properly denied the appellant’s motion for reconsideration arguing that she signed the settlement agreement under duress because of her attorney’s actions. See Vittiglio v Vittiglio, 297 Mich App 391 (2012); but see Restatement Contracts, 2d, § 175.

161892

Whether the defendant has the ability to challenge the relevant term of the consent judgment in this case given that federal law precludes a provision requiring that the plaintiff receive reimbursement or indemnification payments to compensate for reductions in the defendant’s military retirement pay resulting from his election to receive any disability benefits. See Howell v Howell, 581 US ___; 137 S Ct 400; 197 L Ed 2d 781 (2017).

162332-3

Whether, when reviewing the record existing at the time the Saginaw Circuit Court ruled on the appellee’s motion for summary disposition and when that record is construed in the appellant’s favor, the evidence was sufficient to permit a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that age discrimination was a motivating factor in the appellee’s hiring decision and that its stated explanation was mere pretext for unlawful discrimination. See generally Hazle v Ford Motor Co, 464 Mich 456 (2001).

In particular, the appellant should address any inferences arising from evidence that the hiring manager may have focused on job candidates’ respective ages, that there were irregularities in the candidate scoring system, and that the appellee’s stated rationale for its hiring decision varied from its originally posted job description. See, e.g., Krohn v Sedwick James of Mich, Inc, 244 Mich App 289, 298 (2001) (considering the probative value of “stray remarks”); George v Youngstown State Univ, 966 F3d 446, 466 (CA 6, 2020) (recognizing that “evidence suggest[ing] irregularities with the search process . . . can raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether an employer’s asserted reason is pretextual”).

161535

Whether the period of time after the filing of a complaint for divorce is counted when considering whether a spouse was “willfully absent” from the decedent for more than a year before his or her death. MCL 700.2801(2)(e)(i); In re Estate of Erwin, 503 Mich 1 (2018).

162094

(1) whether the proposed claim based on a violation of the standing order sounds in medical malpractice or ordinary negligence; and

(2) whether evidence of the standing order is admissible at trial.

161592

Whether private-figure plaintiffs must prove malice to establish the tort of false light invasion of privacy.

161598

(1) whether, at the time of the request and pursuant to MCL 125.2005, the total value of tax credits extended to General Motors was exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, MCL 15.231 et seq., as “financial or proprietary information” or as “[a] record or portion of a record, material, or other data received, prepared, used, or retained by the fund . . . in connection with an application to or with . . . an award, grant, loan, or investment that relates to financial or proprietary information submitted by the applicant that is considered by the applicant and acknowledged by the board or a designee of the board as confidential”; and

(2) whether MCL 125.2005(11) requires the full disclosure, without redaction, of the tax credit agreement because “[a]ny document to which the fund is a party evidencing a loan, insurance, mortgage, lease, venture, or other type of agreement the fund is authorized to enter into shall not be considered financial or proprietary information that may be exempt from disclosure under subsection (9).”

162434-5

(1) whether MCL 700.5204(2)(b) is unconstitutional because it does not allow for a presumption that a fit parent’s decision is in the best interest of the child, see Troxel v Granville, 530 US 57 (2000); and

(2) whether the Muskegon Probate Court erred by granting the petitioner guardianship in this case.

161839

161007

(1) whether the Court of Appeals properly applied the test for assessing the foreseeability of the alleged harm, see Bertin v Mann, 502 Mich 603, 620-621 (2018) (saying, albeit in the assumption of the risk context, that the test for foreseeability “is objective and focuses on what risks a reasonable participant, under the circumstances, would have foreseen. The risk must be defined by the factual circumstances of the case—it is not enough that the participant could foresee being injured in general; the participant must have been able to foresee that the injury could arise through the ‘mechanism’ it resulted from”);

(2) whether the Court of Appeals erred by holding that no special relationship exists between the senior living facility at issue and its residents, including the decedent. See Bailey v Schaaf, 494 Mich 595 (2013); Williams v Cunningham Drug Stores, Inc, 429 Mich 495 (1988); and

(3) whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that appellees did not owe the decedent a common law duty to monitor and secure the side entrances and exits to the facility, see Hill v Sears, Roebuck & Co, 492 Mich 651 (2012); Valcaniant v Detroit Edison, Co, 470 Mich 82 (2004).

162076

(1) whether the enactment of MCL 480.11a abrogated the appellee’s common law duty of ordinary care with respect to loading cargo for transport by a commercial motor vehicle operated by the appellant; and

(2) whether the appellee owed a duty to the appellant under the “shipper’s exception.” See United States v Savage Truck Line, Inc, 209 F2d 442, 445 (CA 4, 1953)

162094

(1) whether the proposed claim based on a violation of the standing order sounds in medical malpractice or ordinary negligence; and

(2) whether evidence of the standing order is admissible at trial.

160813

Whether the appellees have alleged cognizable constitutional tort claims allowing them to recover a judicially inferred damages remedy. See Smith v Dep’t of Public Health, 428 Mich 540, 648-652 (1987), aff’d sub nom Will v Mich Dep’t of State Police, 491 US 58 (1989) (BOYLE, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

161454

(1) whether, with respect to Covisint Corporation’s cash-out merger with OpenText Corporation, corporate officers and directors owed cognizable common law fiduciary duties to the corporation’s shareholders independent of any statutory duty; and

(2) whether the appellant has standing to bring a direct cause of action under either the common law or MCL 450.1541a.

161655

Whether (1) the trial court improperly assessed the appellee-driver’s credibility regarding the existence of a sudden emergency in granting summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), and

(2) the sudden emergency doctrine is an application of the reasonably prudent person standard, not an affirmative defense, such that it may only be determined by a jury.

161672

Whether the Court of Appeals erred when it determined that the second affidavit of merit constituted an amendment of the first affidavit of merit.

161683

Whether the appellant’s timely filed complaint against the state constituted compliance with the notice requirement of MCL 691.1404. See also MCL 600.6431.

161690-1

(1) whether MCL 600.6440 divests the Court of Claims of jurisdiction over both of the appellees’ causes of action arising under federal statute; and

(2) if so, whether the circuit court shares concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts over those causes of action.

161911

1) whether the appellant’s underlying complaint in its action against the insureds is a “written instrument” under MCR 2.113(C)(1) (formerly MCR 2.113(F)(1)), a “pertinent part” of a written instrument under MCR 2.113(C)(1), or is otherwise part of “the pleadings” in this case such that the lower courts could properly consider it in the MCR 2.116(C)(8) analysis;

(2) whether the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the appellant’s pleadings showed the insureds knowingly provided alcohol to minors and that this knowing act was a proximate cause of the appellant’s damages;

(3) whether pleading proximate causation is the equivalent of pleading that an act “created a direct risk of harm from which the consequences should reasonably have been expected by the insured,” Allstate Ins Co v McCarn, 466 Mich 277, 283 (2002); and

(4) whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Macomb Circuit Court’s grant of summary disposition to appellee State Farm under MCR 2.116(C)(8). See Frankenmuth Mut Ins Co v Masters, 460 Mich 105 (1999); Nabozny v Burkhardt, 461 Mich 471 (2000); Allstate, supra.

162094

(1) whether the proposed claim based on a violation of the standing order sounds in medical malpractice or ordinary negligence; and

(2) whether evidence of the standing order is admissible at trial.

162332-3

Whether, when reviewing the record existing at the time the Saginaw Circuit Court ruled on the appellee’s motion for summary disposition and when that record is construed in the appellant’s favor, the evidence was sufficient to permit a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that age discrimination was a motivating factor in the appellee’s hiring decision and that its stated explanation was mere pretext for unlawful discrimination. See generally Hazle v Ford Motor Co, 464 Mich 456 (2001).

In particular, the appellant should address any inferences arising from evidence that the hiring manager may have focused on job candidates’ respective ages, that there were irregularities in the candidate scoring system, and that the appellee’s stated rationale for its hiring decision varied from its originally posted job description. See, e.g., Krohn v Sedwick James of Mich, Inc, 244 Mich App 289, 298 (2001) (considering the probative value of “stray remarks”); George v Youngstown State Univ, 966 F3d 446, 466 (CA 6, 2020) (recognizing that “evidence suggest[ing] irregularities with the search process . . . can raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether an employer’s asserted reason is pretextual”).

161628, 161650

Whether the appellees’ claims for no-fault personal protection insurance benefits are barred by (1) res judicata or (2) collateral estoppel. See Adair v Michigan, 470 Mich 105, 121 (2004); Monat v State Farm Ins Co, 469 Mich 679, 682-684 & n 2 (2004)

160877-8

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that, under this Court’s precedent, a lifeguard’s delay, even if it constitutes gross negligence, is not a cause in fact of drowning for purposes of determining governmental immunity under MCL 691.1407(2)(c) because of the inherent uncertainty of successful rescue. See Beals v Michigan, 497 Mich 363 (2015); Ray v Swager, 501 Mich 52 (2017).

161948, 161952

Whether snowmobiles and John Deere Gator crossover utility vehicles are motor vehicles for purposes of MCL 691.1405, the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity.

162092

Whether appellee Gwinn Area Community Schools was entitled to summary disposition on appellants’ claim under the public building exception to the Governmental Tort Liability Act, MCL 691.1401 et seq.

161254

Whether the Court of Appeals erred by interpreting MCL 211.7cc(4) such that the petitioner’s principal residence exemption on his property continued through December 31 of the calendar year in which he was not entitled to the exemption.

161948, 161952

Whether snowmobiles and John Deere Gator crossover utility vehicles are motor vehicles for purposes of MCL 691.1405, the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity.

162303

Whether MCL 691.1755(1)(c) requires that the new evidence which demonstrates that the plaintiff did not perpetrate or participate in the crime must be the same new evidence that resulted in the vacation of the charges in the judgment of conviction and the dismissal of those charges.

162416

(1) whether the trial court’s order finding that there was no public necessity to acquire the appellees’ property is “an order of the court . . . determining public necessity” under MCL 213.56(6) that is appealable to the Court of Appeals only by leave;

(2) whether MCL 213.56(6) deprives the Court of Appeals of discretion to consider the appellant’s appeal of right as on leave granted; and

(3) whether the trial court’s ruling that there was no public necessity for the appellant’s proposed acquisition constituted a determination that the proposed acquisition was “improper” and supported an award of attorney fees and expenses under MCL 213.66(2).

162434-5

(1) whether MCL 700.5204(2)(b) is unconstitutional because it does not allow for a presumption that a fit parent’s decision is in the best interest of the child, see Troxel v Granville, 530 US 57 (2000); and

(2) whether the Muskegon Probate Court erred by granting the petitioner guardianship in this case.

162482

Whether the prohibition on discrimination “because of . . . sex” in the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA), MCL 37.2101 et seq., applies to discrimination based on sexual orientation.

162537-8

Whether the appellees violated either MCL 37.1502 or MCL 37.1506a of the Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.1101, et seq., by denying the appellants’ request to install a railing on the front stoop of their condominium.

161254

Whether the Court of Appeals erred by interpreting MCL 211.7cc(4) such that the petitioner’s principal residence exemption on his property continued through December 31 of the calendar year in which he was not entitled to the exemption.

161661

Whether, under the now-repealed Single Business Tax Act, MCL 208.1 et seq., the appellee is entitled to the transfer of single business tax credits, by virtue of the merger of two of its subsidiaries, under the theory that the tax credits are either vested property rights or privileges that automatically transferred by operation of law during the merger.

162692

Whether the appellant’s injuries arose out of and in the course of his employment with appellee LexaMar Corp. such that LexaMar Corp. is required to pay compensation under MCL 418.301(1). See Smith v Chrysler Group, LLC, 331 Mich App 492, 497-498 (2020); Larson, Workers’ Compensation Law § 27.03(1)(c)(2019).

160358-9

(1) whether the “party aggrieved” standard of MCL 125.3605 requires a party to show some special damages not common to other property owners similarly situated, see Olsen v Jude & Reed, LLC, 325 Mich App 170 (2018);

(2) whether the meaning of “person aggrieved” in MCL 125.3604(1) differs from that of “party aggrieved” in MCL 125.3605, and if so what standard applies; and

(3) whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Allegan Circuit Court’s dismissal of appellant’s appeals from the decisions of the Saugatuck Township Zoning Board of Appeals.

160991

Whether MCL 600.5813 applies to municipalities seeking to enjoin zoning ordinance violations.