Justice Barrett’s recent dissent in Fischer v. United States captures her statutory-analysis approach.

Her conversational writing style—one that can be easily understood by the lay public—may be thought of as common sense. It’s also fair to assume that Justice Kagan contributed to some of its tone since she (and Justice Sotomayor) joined it.

Justice Barrett’s dissent caught my highlighting eye for a different reason: the sharp phrases she used to paint her disagreement with the Court majority. Very sharp in critique but still civil in tone.

Some examples:

. . . seems open and shut. So why does the Court hold otherwise? Because it simply cannot believe that Congress meant what it said.

The Court, abandoning that approach, does textual backflips to find some way—any way—to narrow the reach of subsection (c)(2).

The case for the Government’s interpretation is straightforward. It can be accomplished in three paragraphs, as compared to the Court’s many, many more. Ante, at 4–12. Start with the verbs:

Opting for a narrower approach, the Court declines to take (c)(2) on its own terms.

Other means of obstructing a proceeding—say, by shutting it down—are out.

This interpretation might sound faithful to the statute, because the limit comes from a related provision rather than thin air. But snipping words from one subsection and grafting them onto another violates our normal interpretive principles.

The Court’s reasons for departing from these rules are thin.

These canons are valuable tools. But applying either to (c)(2) is like using a hammer to pound in a screw—it looks like it might work, but using it botches the job.

To my knowledge, we have never applied either of these canons to a statute resembling §1512(c). Rather than identify such a case, the Court invents examples . . .

The Court’s football example is only slightly better.

Put aside that it is hard to imagine anyone describing “trash talk” as inflicting an “injury” or “harming” a player in a football game.

But §1512(c) is structured differently than the statute in Begay. * * * Postscript: Seven years after Begay was decided, we held ACCA’s residual clause void for vagueness. Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 597 (2015). So the clause is not only distinguishable, but also a poor model for statutory interpretation.

What the Court does not say is that its rewrite also eliminates the need for (c)(1)’s examples.

Both formulations are problematic—and not only because both are textual.

The Court exaggerates.

In fact, the broader statutory context works against the Court’s interpretation.

This fear is overstated.

To begin with, the Court ignores that . . . .

By atextually narrowing §1512(c)(2), the Court has failed to respect the prerogatives of the political branches.