Subject matter: Property; short-term residential rental restrictive covenant

Issue: Whether a restrictive covenant limiting lot use to “single family residence purposes” unambiguously prohibits all short-term residential rentals.

Argued: March 13, 2025

Filings

Background: Homeowners in Swift Estates, a lakefront community in Berrien County, are locked in a legal dispute over short-term vacation rentals. The defendants used an online platform to rent their Lake Michigan beachfront properties as seasonal vacation rentals, while neighboring plaintiffs argued this violated the community’s Declaration of Covenants and Restrictions. The plaintiffs sued seeking to stop the rentals, and both the trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled in their favor, permanently banning short-term rentals in the development and affirming that such rentals violate the governing property restrictions.

Cases abeyed pending decision: None

Case outcome (disposition): 07/09/2025 Order (Court of Appeals affirmed by equal division of the Michigan Supreme Court)

Subject matter: Subject-matter jurisdiction; gaming-related contract/account disputes

Issues: Whether (1) each of the plaintiff’s common law claims is inconsistent with and preempted by the Lawful Internet Gaming Act (LIGA), MCL 432.301 et seq., such that the Wayne Circuit Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this action; and

(2) the Michigan Gaming Control Board (MGCB) has jurisdiction, exclusive or otherwise, over common law claims regarding contract or account disputes, and if so, what statutes or administrative rules govern its resolution of the dispute.

Argued: April 10, 2025

Filings

Background: A player won $3.2 million on an online gaming site but could only withdraw $100,000 before the operator suspended her account, claiming the winnings resulted from a game error. The player sued for fraud, conversion, and breach of contract in Wayne Circuit Court, but both the trial court and Court of Appeals ruled they lacked jurisdiction—holding that Michigan’s Lawful Internet Gaming Act gives the Michigan Gaming Control Board exclusive authority over such disputes. The gaming board declined to pursue formal action, leaving the player without recourse in either forum.

Cases abeyed pending decision: 167015

Case outcome (disposition): MM/DD/YYYY Case pending

Subject matter: Property tax foreclosure; Takings Clause (federal or state)

Issues: (1) Whether the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that both MCL 211.78t and MCL 211.78m apply retroactively;

(2) if so, whether plaintiffs’ constitutional takings claims are precluded by MCL 211.78t, see Hathon v State of Michigan, ___ Mich ___ (July 29, 2024) (Docket No. 165219);

(3) if not, whether a violation of the Takings Clause of the Michigan Constitution, Const 1963, art 10, § 2, or of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution may occur as to a tax foreclosure when there is no public auction of the foreclosed property and a governmental unit retains or purchases the property, resulting in no surplus proceeds;

(4) whether there was a violation of either Takings Clause by Oakland County under the facts of this case; and 

(5) if so, what compensation, if any, the taxpayer is entitled to from Oakland County.

Argued: April 10, 2025

Filings

Background: The plaintiffs owned real property in Southfield.  When they became delinquent on their property tax payments, defendant Oakland County foreclosed on the properties under the General Property Tax Act (GPTA), MCL 211.1 et seq., which at that time required the county to take title to real property to cover the cost of the unpaid tax debt and associated fees without compensating the owners for their equity.  The plaintiffs entered into payment plans but failed to make the required payments and did not appeal the judgments of foreclosure.  Defendant City of Southfield exercised its right of first refusal under then-MCL 211.78m(1), and purchased the properties for the minimum bid with funds from defendant Southfield Non-Profit Housing Corporation, and conveyed the properties to defendant Southfield Neighborhood Revitalization Initiative.  The plaintiffs sued, alleging violations of their constitutional rights to procedural and substantive due process and equal protection.  They also alleged violations of the Takings Clauses of the Michigan and United States Constitutions, and violation of the GPTA.  The trial court granted summary disposition in favor of the defendants.  The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion, but the Supreme Court remanded this case to the trial court for reconsideration in light of Rafaeli v Oakland Co, 505 Mich 429 (2020), in which the Supreme Court held that when real property is taken to satisfy an unpaid tax debt, the government’s retention of surplus proceeds of the tax-foreclosure sale is a taking under Const 1963, art 10, § 2, entitling the former property owner to just compensation.  On remand, the trial court granted summary disposition in favor of the defendants, holding that Rafaeli did not apply retroactively and, regardless, the plaintiffs did not have a protected property interest pursuant to Rafaeli.  The Court of Appeals, in a published opinion, affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings, holding among other things that:  (1) Rafaeli applies retroactively; (2) the trial court erred by holding that the federal Takings Clause did not recognize a protected property interest in the plaintiffs’ equity in their homes; (3) the trial court erred by concluding that this Court’s decision in Rafaeli did not permit the plaintiffs’ takings claims against the county; and (4) the trial court erred by refusing to give retroactive application to the amended language in MCL 211.78m and 78t.  The Supreme Court held this case in abeyance pending the decision in Schafer v Kent Co (Docket No. 164975).  The Supreme Court later held in Schafer that Rafaeli applies retroactively to claims not yet final on July 17, 2020, the date the opinion was issued.  Schafer v Kent Co, ___ Mich ___ (July 29, 2024) (Docket No. 164975). 

Case abeyed pending decision: 165640

Case outcome (disposition): MM/DD/YYYY Case pending

Subject matter: Property tax foreclosure; Takings Clause (federal or state)

Issues: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in: (1) holding that the plaintiff successfully established that the defendants violated the Takings Clause of the Michigan Constitution, Const 1963, art 10, § 2; and

(2) directing the Ingham Circuit Court to calculate the “surplus” owed on the property by reference to the value of the property less what the plaintiff owed on it when the foreclosure occurred.

Argued: April 10, 2025 

Filings

Background: A commercial property owner who failed to pay 2014-2015 property taxes lost his property to Ingham County foreclosure when it didn’t sell at auction and was transferred to the county land bank. The owner sued, claiming an unconstitutional taking because he never received compensation for his property equity, plus a bailment claim for personal property left on-site. The trial court dismissed both claims, but the Court of Appeals reversed on the constitutional taking claim while upholding dismissal of the bailment claim.

Case abeyed pending decision: 165640

Case outcome (disposition): MM/DD/YYYY Case pending

Subject matter: Whistleblowers’ Protection Act

Issues: (1) Whether the Court of Appeals properly determined that Saginaw County was not the plaintiff’s employer for purposes of her Whistleblowers’ Protection Act, MCL 15.361 et seq., claim;

(2) whether the plaintiff’s alleged efforts to bring a criminal prosecution into compliance with MCL 771.1 gave rise to a common-law claim for termination in violation of public policy as recognized by Suchodolski v Mich Consol Gas Co, 412 Mich 692, 694-695 (1982); and

(3) whether the plaintiff established the existence of a genuine issue of material fact regarding her intentional tort claims of false imprisonment and assault and battery.

Argued: January 22, 2025

Filings

Background: An assistant prosecuting attorney in Saginaw County reported her supervisor for an allegedly unlawful plea deal, then faced workplace retaliation that led to her resignation. She sued multiple defendants under the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act and for intentional torts. After conflicting lower court rulings, the Michigan Supreme Court partially reversed the Court of Appeals, finding genuine factual disputes on key issues, including whether her supervisor acted in good faith and whether she engaged in protected whistleblowing activity. On remand, the Court of Appeals narrowed the surviving claims significantly, dismissing her suit against Saginaw County (not her employer), her public policy claim, and her intentional tort claims, leaving only her WPA retaliation claim against the prosecuting attorney’s office to proceed to trial.

Cases abeyed pending decision: None

Case outcome (disposition): MM/DD/YYYY Case pending

Subject matter: Medical malpractice

Issues: Whether: (1) the Court of Appeals correctly applied the ostensible agency test set forth in Grewe v Mount Clemens General Hosp, 404 Mich 240 (1978), see Markel v William Beaumont Hosp, 510 Mich 1071 (2022); and

(2) the defendant-appellee is entitled to summary disposition of the plaintiff-appellant’s medical malpractice claim that is premised on vicarious liability for the alleged negligence of Dr. Linet Lonappan under a theory of ostensible agency.

Argued: April 10, 2025

Filings

Background: Patient sued hospital for medical malpractice, claiming vicarious liability for non-employee doctor’s negligence under ostensible agency theory. The trial court granted the hospital’s summary disposition motion. After initial denial, Michigan Supreme Court intervened twice—first remanding to clarify the Grewe ostensible agency standard, then reversing the Court of Appeals outright in December 2022. On final remand, the Court of Appeals (2-1) again affirmed summary disposition for the hospital, ruling that ostensible agency requires proof of patient reliance on apparent authority, which the plaintiff failed to establish.

Cases abeyed pending decision: None

Case outcome (disposition): 07/09/2025 Order (Reverse Court of Appeals opinion and remand to trial court. Dissenting statement by Justice Zahra.)

Subject matter: Standing; mandamus; election inspectors/major political parties

Issues: Whether the lower courts erred by holding that neither plaintiff has standing to pursue their claims for declaratory or mandamus relief, see Lansing Sch Ed Ass’n v Lansing Bd of Ed, 487 Mich 349 (2010), and more specifically: (1) whether the statutory scheme governing the appointment of election inspectors clearly implies that the Legislature intended to confer standing on the major political parties to enforce the partisan-parity mandate of MCL 168.674(2);

(2) whether either plaintiff has standing to seek a writ of mandamus based on a special injury, right, or substantial interest that was and will continue to be detrimentally affected in a manner different from the citizenry at large; and

(3) whether either plaintiff has standing to seek a declaratory judgment because it meets the requirements under MCR 2.605.

Argued: March 13, 2025

Filings

Background: The Michigan Republican Party and RNC sued Flint’s Board of Election Commissioners in October 2022, claiming the city violated state law by failing to appoint equal numbers of Republican and Democratic election inspectors at polling places and absentee ballot counting boards. The plaintiffs sought a court order forcing compliance with the equal-appointment requirements under Michigan election law.

Both the trial court and Court of Appeals rejected the challenge: the lower court dismissed for lack of standing and denied the requested mandamus relief, while the Court of Appeals affirmed in a 2-1 split decision. The Republicans appealed after the November 2022 election had already concluded.

Cases abeyed pending decision: None

Case outcome (disposition): MM/DD/YYYY Case pending

Subject matter: Parental rights (termination)

Issues: (1) whether reasonable efforts to reunify the child and the respondent must be made where the respondent was not the perpetrator of criminal sexual conduct involving penetration, but instead facilitated, encouraged, or allowed such conduct by a third party in exchange for some benefit to the respondent, see MCL 712A.19a(2)(a), MCL 722.638(1) and (2);

(2) if so, whether the lack of reasonable reunification efforts in this case was plain error affecting the respondent’s substantial rights, see generally In re Ferranti, 504 Mich 1, 29 (2019);

(3) whether the Department of Health and Human Services satisfied the requirements of MCL 722.638(3);

(4) if so, whether the termination of the respondent’s parental rights should be affirmed under that provision; and 

(5) whether the failure to advise the respondent of her right to appeal following the preliminary hearing was plain error affecting the respondent’s substantial rights, see MCR 3.965(B)(15).

Argued: May 7, 2025

Filings

Background: A mother lost custody of her two minor children after her 13-year-old daughter reported that the mother had twice allowed a male acquaintance to sexually assault the child in exchange for drugs. DHHS removed the children in February 2023 and sought termination of the mother’s parental rights. The trial court bypassed reunification efforts and terminated the mother’s rights after finding clear and convincing evidence of statutory grounds. The Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that: (1) circumstances didn’t warrant skipping reasonable reunification efforts, (2) this error prejudiced the mother, and (3) the trial court failed to inform the mother of her appeal rights after the preliminary hearing, preventing her from challenging the denial of reunification services.

Cases abeyed pending decision: None

Case outcome (disposition): MM/DD/YYYY Case pending

Subject matter: SORA (Sex Offenders Registration Act) lifetime registration and monitoring

Issues: Whether (1) requiring the defendant to register as a sex offender under the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA), MCL 28.721 et seq., as amended by 2020 PA 295, effective March 24, 2021 (the 2021 SORA), for the rest of his life constitutes cruel or unusual punishment under Const 1963, art 1, § 16 or cruel and unusual punishment under US Const, Am VIII;

(2) lifetime electronic monitoring, when imposed without an individualized assessment of the defendant’s recidivism risk and without providing a mechanism for removing the monitoring requirement, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under US Const, Am VIII or cruel or unusual punishment under Const 1963, art 1, § 16, see generally People v Betts, 507 Mich 527 (2021), but see People v Hallak, 310 Mich App 555, 577 (2015), rev’d in part on other grounds 499 Mich 879 (2016);

(3) lifetime electronic monitoring constitutes cruel and/or unusual punishment as applied in this case; and

(4) lifetime electronic monitoring constitutes an unreasonable search in violation of US Const, Am IV or Const 1963, art 1, § 11, see State v Grady, 372 NC 509 (2019), and Park v State, 305 Ga 348 (2019), but see Hallak, 310 Mich App at 581.

Argued: March 12, 2025

Filings

Background: The defendant was jury convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct.  The trial court sentenced him to 30 to 45.8 years in prison. The Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction, but vacated his sentence and remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing because the trial court failed to explain why it exceeded the 25-year statutory minimum. On remand, the trial court sentenced the defendant to 25 to 40 years in prison. The judgment of sentence indicated that upon the defendant’s release, he would be subject to lifetime electronic monitoring and would be required to register as a sex offender under the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA), MCL 28.721 et seq.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s imposition of lifetime electronic monitoring and lifetime registration under SORA.

Cases abeyed pending decision: 26 (approx.)

Case outcome (disposition): MM/DD/YYYY Case pending

Subject matter: SORA (Sex Offenders Registration Act) lifetime registration and monitoring

Issues: Whether (1) lifetime electronic monitoring, when imposed without an individualized assessment of the defendant’s recidivism risk and without providing a mechanism for removing the monitoring requirement, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under US Const, Am VIII or cruel or unusual punishment under Const 1963, art 1, § 16, see generally People v Betts, 507 Mich 527 (2021), but see People v Hallak, 310 Mich App 555, 577 (2015), rev’d in part on other grounds 499 Mich 879 (2016);

(2) lifetime electronic monitoring constitutes cruel and/or unusual punishment as applied in this case; and

(3) lifetime electronic monitoring constitutes an unreasonable search in violation of US Const, Am IV or Const 1963, art 1, § 11, see State v Grady, 372 NC 509 (2019), and Park v State, 305 Ga 348 (2019), but see Hallak, 310 Mich App at 581.

Argued: March 12, 2025

Filings

Background: The defendant was jury convicted of first- and second-degree criminal sexual conduct involving a victim under 13, sentenced to 25-40 years and 10-15 years concurrent, plus mandatory lifetime electronic monitoring. The defendant challenged the monitoring as an unconstitutional search and cruel/unusual punishment, but the trial court and Court of Appeals both rejected the challenge, following the People v Hallak precedent requiring lifetime monitoring under MCL 750.520n.

Cases abeyed pending decision: 14 (approx.)

Case outcome (disposition): MM/DD/YYYY Case pending

Subject matter: Rape-shield statute; evidence

Issues: (1) Whether a child complainant’s act of viewing pornography during the course of sexual abuse by a relative constitutes “sexual conduct” for purposes of the rape-shield statute, MCL 750.520j;

(2) whether the rape-shield statute precludes the admission of evidence that the child complainants were subjected to prior sexual abuse, to explain their age-inappropriate sexual knowledge, unless the defendant proves that another person was convicted of criminal sexual conduct involving the complainants, and the facts underlying the previous conviction are significantly similar to the charged conduct to be relevant to the instant proceeding, see People v Morse, 231 Mich App 424, 437 (1998); and

(3) whether barring evidence of the complainants’ prior sexual abuse and of a complainant’s viewing of pornography during the course of prior sexual abuse would constitute a denial of the defendant’s constitutional right to confrontation or the right to present a defense, see People v Arenda, 416 Mich 1 (1982).

Argued: March 12, 2025

Filings

Background: The defendant faces 16 sexual assault charges involving three minors. He tried to introduce evidence of the complainants’ prior sexual abuse by another relative, pornography viewing, and inappropriate touching between the complainants. The Macomb County Circuit Court excluded all evidence under Michigan’s rape shield statute, following People v Morse, which requires conviction of the prior abuser and substantial similarity between past and current allegations. The trial court also held that the complainants’ alleged viewing of pornography was sexual conduct subject to the rape shield law. 

The Court of Appeals partially reversed, ruling that pornography viewing alone doesn’t constitute excludable “sexual conduct” under the rape shield law, but remanded for further admissibility analysis. The Court of Appeals affirmed all other trial court rulings that excluded the defendant’s proposed evidence.

Cases abeyed pending decision: None

Case outcome (disposition): 07/14/2025 Opinion (Unanimous by Justice Bolden affirming and reversing the Court of Appeals in part, remanding to trial court for further proceedings.)

Subject matter: Contempt of court

Issues: (1) Whether jeopardy attaches to summary contempt proceedings and if so,

(2) whether the reversal of the appellant’s summary contempt conviction means double jeopardy would bar a remand for nonsummary contempt proceedings.

Argued: May 7, 2025

Filings

Background: Attorney Kathy Murphy was sentenced to two days in jail for contempt of court after engaging in unspecified conduct during a recess at her client’s preliminary examination before 36th District Judge Kenyetta Stanford Jones. Wayne Circuit Judge Noah Hood reversed Murphy’s conviction, ruling the district judge abused her discretion by failing to specify what happened, but remanded for new contempt proceedings under proper procedural rules. Murphy unsuccessfully argued the remand would violate double jeopardy protections, with both the circuit court and the Court of Appeals rejecting her claim and allowing the contempt hearing to go forward.

Cases abeyed pending decision: None

Case outcome (disposition): MM/DD/YYYY Case pending

Subject matter: Strict liability; mens rea

Issues: (1) Whether the offense of being a prisoner in possession of a controlled substance (“PPCS”), MCL 800.281(4), is a strict liability offense or should be construed as having a scienter requirement or mens rea element, see MCL 8.9; People v Ramsdell, 230 Mich App 386 (1998); People v Tombs, 472 Mich 446 (2005); and People v Magnant, 508 Mich 151 (2021); and

(2) if PPCS is not a strict liability offense, then what form of scienter requirement or mens rea element applies.

Argued: April 9, 2025

Filings

Background: While a prisoner, the defendant was convicted of possessing a controlled substance after another prisoner slipped drugs through his cell door slot. The defendant challenges whether the state must prove he knowingly possessed the contraband. The defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to preserve his argument that the prisoner possession statute requires proof of intent, citing MCL 8.9’s general requirement that crimes include a mental state element unless strict liability is clearly imposed. While People v Ramsdell (1998) established this as a strict liability offense, the defendant contends this conflicts with the statutory presumption favoring intent requirements. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction in a published decision, reaffirming that the prison possession statute imposes strict liability regardless of the defendant’s knowledge.

Cases abeyed pending decision: None

Case outcome (disposition): MM/DD/YYYY Case pending

Subject matter: Sentence guidelines scoring

Issues: Whether the Branch Circuit Court properly assigned 25 points to Offense Variable 19, MCL 777.49(a).

Argued: April 23, 2025

Filings

Background: The defendant was caught with meth during 2021 traffic stop, then dropped more meth from his pocket while being booked on separate charges in 2022. Despite a plea deal dismissing the jail incident charges, the trial court added 25 points to his sentence under Offense Variable 19 for threatening jail security. Defendant appealed, arguing he wasn’t technically “in jail” during booking, that dismissed charges shouldn’t count toward sentencing, and that he warned officers about the drugs. The Court of Appeals upheld the enhanced sentence, ruling that booking areas are part of the jail, post-offense conduct during justice proceedings counts, and the defendant’s warnings didn’t eliminate the security threat.

Cases abeyed pending decision: None

Case outcome (disposition): 07/09/2025 Order (Vacate Court of Appeals and remand to trial court with instructions. Dissenting statement by Justice Bernstein joined by Justice Zahra.)

Subject matter: Fourth Amendment; cell phone search; good-faith exception; ineffective assistance of counsel

Issues: Whether the Court of Appeals erred by: (1) holding that the warrant to search the defendant’s cell phone violated the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement, see People v Hughes, 506 Mich 512, 538 (2020);

(2) failing to sever any valid portions of the search warrant from any invalid portions, see People v Keller, 479 Mich 467, 479 (2007);

(3) holding that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply, see People v Goldston, 470 Mich 523, 531 (2004), discussing United States v Leon, 468 US 897, 923 (1984); and

(4) finding that trial counsel deprived the defendant of his right to the effective assistance of counsel by failing to move to suppress the evidence obtained from his cell phone on these grounds, see Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 687-688 (1984).

Argued: April 10, 2025

Filings

Background: The defendant was convicted on multiple felony charges—including safe breaking and larceny over $20,000—based largely on incriminating text messages from his cell phone. A split Court of Appeals panel reversed all convictions, finding ineffective assistance of counsel: the defense attorney failed to challenge the cell phone search warrant for lacking Fourth Amendment particularity. The Court of Appeals majority reasoned that a motion to suppress would have succeeded and resulted in the exclusion of the key evidence, as the good-faith exception didn’t apply.

Case abeyed pending decision: 167477

Case outcome (disposition): MM/DD/YYYY Case pending

Subject matter: Jury verdict; sentencing

Issues: (1) Whether the jury acquitted the defendant of the principal charge of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine when it found him guilty of the lesser charge of simple possession; and

(2) if so, whether the Ottawa Circuit Court violated People v Beck, 504 Mich 605 (2019), in sentencing the defendant.

Argued: May 7, 2025

Filings

Background: The defendant faced charges for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine but was convicted only of simple possession. At sentencing, the trial court imposed the maximum guideline sentence (46 months), citing evidence of digital scales, baggies, and cash as proof of intent to distribute—the very conduct the jury had rejected. Though the court acknowledged sentencing “for possession,” it relied on acquitted conduct to justify the harsh sentence. The defendant appealed under People v Beck, which bars sentencing based on acquitted conduct as a due process violation. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding no error because the trial court stated it was sentencing only for the possession conviction, despite explicitly relying on distribution evidence to reach that sentence.

Cases abeyed pending decision: None

Case outcome (disposition): 07/09/2025 order (Reversing Part II(C) of Court of Appeals and remanding to trial court for resentencing.)