The Michigan Supreme Court heard arguments on the application in two cases during its 2024–25 term involving sentences that included lifetime electronic monitoring and/or required registration as a sex offender under the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA). Dozens of other pending applications to the Michigan Supreme Court are held in abeyance until these cases are decided.
The briefed questions in response to the Court’s May 31, 2024 orders were whether:
| People v Kardasz (165008) | People v Martin (166339) |
| (1) requiring the defendant to register as a sex offender under the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA), MCL 28.721 et seq., as amended by 2020 PA 295, effective March 24, 2021 (the 2021 SORA), for the rest of his life constitutes cruel or unusual punishment under Const 1963, art 1, § 16 or cruel and unusual punishment under US Const, Am VIII; | |
| (2) lifetime electronic monitoring, when imposed without an individualized assessment of the defendant’s recidivism risk and without providing a mechanism for removing the monitoring requirement, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under US Const, Am VIII or cruel or unusual punishment under Const 1963, art 1, § 16, see generally People v Betts, 507 Mich 527 (2021), but see People v Hallak, 310 Mich App 555, 577 (2015), rev’d in part on other grounds 499 Mich 879 (2016); | (1) lifetime electronic monitoring, when imposed without an individualized assessment of the defendant’s recidivism risk and without providing a mechanism for removing the monitoring requirement, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under US Const, Am VIII or cruel or unusual punishment under Const 1963, art 1, § 16, see generally People v Betts, 507 Mich 527 (2021), but see People v Hallak, 310 Mich App 555, 577 (2015), rev’d in part on other grounds 499 Mich 879 (2016); |
| (3) lifetime electronic monitoring constitutes cruel and/or unusual punishment as applied in this case; and | (2) lifetime electronic monitoring constitutes cruel and/or unusual punishment as applied in this case; and |
| (4) lifetime electronic monitoring constitutes an unreasonable search in violation of US Const, Am IV or Const 1963, art 1, § 11, see State v Grady, 372 NC 509 (2019), and Park v State, 305 Ga 348 (2019), but see Hallak, 310 Mich App at 581. | (3) lifetime electronic monitoring constitutes an unreasonable search in violation of US Const, Am IV or Const 1963, art 1, § 11, see State v Grady, 372 NC 509 (2019), and Park v State, 305 Ga 348 (2019), but see Hallak, 310 Mich App at 581. |
Arguments were heard on the applications on March 12, 2025.
Additional briefing was later ordered to consider whether one’s parole length factors in the lifetime electronic monitoring constitutional analysis.
| People v Kardasz (165008) | People v Martin (166339) |
| (1) what length of parole the defendant is subject to and whether the defendant is subject to parole for life, see MCL 791.242(3); and | (1) what length of parole the defendant is subject to and whether the defendant is subject to parole for life, see MCL 791.242(3); and |
| (2) what impact, if any, the term of parole has on the constitutionality of the defendant’s sentence to lifetime electronic monitoring. | (2) what impact, if any, the term of parole has on the constitutionality of the defendant’s sentence to lifetime electronic monitoring. |
Briefing by the parties and the Michigan State Police (as amicus) is expected to be filed on or before September 18, 2025.