Before the start of classes, new law students are encouraged to read Orin S. Kerr’s How to Read a Legal Opinion: A Guide for New Law Students, 11 GREEN BAG 2D 51 (2007) to find their footing on how to read and understand the cases they will be studying.

Fortunately, anyone can repurpose Professor Kerr’s framework into an AI prompt to help understand long appellate opinions—especially the fractured decisions.

You should still read the actual opinion, of course. But many will find the full opinion read to be easier to understand when they have a structured AI-generated outline to follow.

The prompt:

Using plain language, outline the attached legal decision by applying Orin S. Kerr’s “How to Read a Legal Opinion” framework. Only rely on the attached files. The response must answer each topic in the following order: 1) The case caption. 2) The opinion author. 3) Summarized facts. 4) The parties’ specific legal arguments. 5) The law of the case. 6) The majority opinion’s reasoning. 7) The significance of the majority opinion. 8) The authors of any concurring and dissenting opinions and the corresponding rationale. 9) The case disposition.

With that prompt, one simply attaches Professor Kerr’s essay and attaches the appellate opinion to be outlined.

People v Tadgerson (165678) is a 35-page, divided opinion the Michigan Supreme Court decided on July 21, 2025. Below are examples showing how the AI tools NotebookLM and Claude.ai each responded to the prompt.

Prompting NotebookLM

NotebookLM responded to the above prompt with the attached opinion and Kerr essay with this overview:

Here is an outline of the legal decision, PEOPLE v TADGERSON, applying Orin S. Kerr’s framework:

The Case Disposition The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion, particularly because the defendant’s no-contest plea was based on the erroneous conclusion that PPCS was a strict-liability offense.

The Case Caption The case is titled PEOPLE v TADGERSON. More formally, it is PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v CHRISTOPHER LEHMAN TADGERSON, Defendant-Appellant. This is a criminal case, brought by the government (the People of the State of Michigan) against the defendant, Christopher Lehman Tadgerson.

The Opinion Author The majority opinion was written by Justice BOLDEN, joined by Chief Justice CAVANAGH and Justices BERNSTEIN, WELCH, and THOMAS.

Summarized Facts Christopher L. Tadgerson, a prisoner, was charged with being a prisoner in possession of a controlled substance (PPCS), MCL 800.281(4). A corrections officer observed another prisoner drop a crumpled piece of paper into the slot of Tadgerson’s cell door. The officer saw Tadgerson holding the paper and demanded he hand it over. Tadgerson stated he believed it was “just a note with some words on it” and had not looked at its contents. The paper contained two orange strips, which lab testing confirmed was buprenorphine, also known as Suboxone, a schedule III controlled substance. Tadgerson did not have a valid prescription for it. Although an initial drug screen tested positive for Suboxone, a retest was negative. The entire incident was captured on video.

The Parties’ Specific Legal Arguments

Prosecution Arguments:

At the preliminary examination, the prosecution argued that PPCS is a strict-liability offense, relying on People v Ramsdell (1998).

They contended that the Legislature intended MCL 800.281(4) to be a strict-liability offense, citing legislative history, which the Supreme Court found unavailing.

They also argued that MCL 8.9 should not apply because the phrase “plainly imposes strict liability” in MCL 8.9(2) is ambiguous.

Other arguments, including constitutional challenges to MCL 8.9, were waived because they were not raised in lower courts.

Defendant’s Arguments:

At the preliminary examination, Tadgerson argued that a bindover was not appropriate because the prosecution had not proved he knowingly possessed a controlled substance.

He requested that jury instructions include a mens rea (culpable mental state) element for PPCS, arguing that MCL 8.9 applied and required the prosecution to show he knowingly possessed the Suboxone, despite the Ramsdell holding.

Tadgerson asserted that for possessory offenses like PPCS, the applicable culpable mental state should be “knowledge,” aligning with prior case law where “an injury is criminal only if inflicted knowingly”.

The Law of the Case

MCL 800.281(4): This statute dictates that “a prisoner shall not possess any alcoholic liquor, prescription drug, poison, or controlled substance”.

MCL 8.9 (enacted in 2015): This statute generally requires a culpability element for criminal offenses unless specific conditions are met.

MCL 8.9(2): States that culpability is not required if the statutory language “does not specify any degree of culpability and plainly imposes strict criminal liability”.

MCL 8.9(3): If a statute “neither specifies culpability nor plainly imposes strict liability,” the offense element is established only if a person acts with intent, knowledge, or recklessness.

MCL 8.9(9): Explicitly states that “[t]he mere absence of a specified state of mind for an element of a covered offense shall not be construed to mean that the legislature affirmatively intended not to require the prosecution to prove any state of mind”.

MCL 8.9(10): Provides definitions for “intent,” “knowledge,” and “recklessness,” with recklessness defined as “an act or failure to act that demonstrates a deliberate, willful, or wanton disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk without reasonable caution for the rights, safety, and property of others”.

People v Ramsdell (1998): This Court of Appeals case, predating MCL 8.9, had previously held that PPCS was a strict-liability offense due to the absence of the word “knowingly” in MCL 800.281(4).

General Legal Principles: Strict-liability offenses are generally disfavored, and courts usually infer a criminal intent element when a statute is silent on mens rea, unless there is a clear legislative intent otherwise.

The Majority Opinion’s Reasoning

The Supreme Court disagreed with the lower courts, concluding that MCL 800.281(4) does not “plainly impose” strict liability.

Superseding Ramsdell: The Court found that Ramsdell‘s reasoning—that the mere absence of a specified state of mind in MCL 800.281(4) indicated strict liability—is inconsistent with the plain language of MCL 8.9(9). MCL 8.9(9) directly prohibits construing the mere absence of mens rea as an affirmative legislative intent to eliminate it.

Purpose of MCL 8.9: The enactment of MCL 8.9 several years after Ramsdell fundamentally changed the analysis. The Legislature intended MCL 8.9 to greatly reduce the number of strict-liability offenses and broadly impose a general mens rea requirement where none was specified, as a matter of efficiency rather than amending individual statutes.

Interpreting “plainly imposes strict liability”: The Court found this phrase in MCL 8.9(2) not ambiguous. It means the statutory language itself must clearly establish strict liability. Referring to dictionary definitions, “plain” means “without obscurity or ambiguity” and “impose” means “to establish or apply by authority”. The Court’s prior caselaw consistently required clear indications in the statute for strict liability.

Application of MCL 8.9(3): Since MCL 800.281(4) neither specifies culpability nor plainly imposes strict liability, MCL 8.9(3) applies. This mandates that the elements of PPCS are established only if a person acts with intent, knowledge, or recklessness.

Determining the Culpable Mental State: The Court declined to select “knowledge” as the most appropriate mental state for possessory offenses, as MCL 8.9(3) uses the disjunctive “or,” indicating an alternative choice. Since the statute provides no basis to choose one over the others, and “recklessness” is the least burdensome and serves as the default standard in MCL 8.9, the prosecution is required to prove—at a minimum—that a defendant acted with recklessness.

The Significance of the Majority Opinion

Holding: MCL 800.281(4) (being a prisoner in possession of a controlled substance) is not a strict-liability offense.

New Rule: To establish a violation of MCL 800.281(4), the prosecution must prove that a defendant acted with intent, knowledge, or recklessness. The minimum culpable mental state required is recklessness.

Impact on Precedent: The reasoning of People v Ramsdell (1998) is inconsistent with and superseded by the plain language of MCL 8.9. This decision aligns with the Legislature’s intent to significantly restrict the imposition of strict criminal liability and broaden the application of mens rea requirements for criminal offenses in Michigan.

The Authors of Any Concurring and Dissenting Opinions and the Corresponding Rationale

Justice ZAHRA (Dissenting):

He would have held that the Legislature plainly intended MCL 800.281(4) to be a strict-liability crime.

He argued the majority’s application of MCL 8.9(9) (regarding “mere absence” of mens rea) was unduly narrow because MCL 800.281 does contain an express mens rea element in another subsection (MCL 800.281(2), which uses “knows or has reason to know”). This suggests a deliberate omission in MCL 800.281(4).

He noted that MCL 800.281(1) and (2) concern active verbs like “sell, give, or furnish,” which imply criminal intent, whereas MCL 800.281(4) is “far more straightforward,” prohibiting only actual possession.

He contended the majority’s interpretation of “plainly imposes” in MCL 8.9(2) was overly broad. He believed this phrase should incorporate Michigan’s preexisting caselaw for determining strict liability, not just dictionary definitions. He argued that the majority’s view effectively requires an explicit legislative statement that an offense has no mens rea.

He stated that his interpretation would not render MCL 8.9 useless, as it would codify longstanding caselaw principles and could apply to statutes like MCL 801.263, which, unlike MCL 800.281(4), does not have mens rea language in one subsection that is omitted from another.

Justice HOOD: Did not participate because the Court considered the case before he assumed office.

Prompting Claude.ai

Claude responded to the same prompt and attached files this way:

People v. Tadgerson Legal Opinion Analysis

Using Orin S. Kerr’s Framework

1. Case Caption

People of the State of Michigan v. Christopher Lehman Tadgerson

• Docket No. 165678
• Michigan Supreme Court
• Decided July 21, 2025

2. Opinion Author

Justice Kyra H. Bolden wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Megan K. Cavanagh and Justices Richard H. Bernstein, Elizabeth M. Welch, and Kimberly A. Thomas.

3. Summarized Facts

Christopher Tadgerson was a prisoner when another inmate dropped something into his cell door slot. A corrections officer (Shawn Larson) observed this and immediately demanded that Tadgerson hand over the item. Tadgerson was holding a crumpled piece of paper containing two orange strips with the number eight written on them. Tadgerson had not looked at the contents and believed it was “just a note with some words on it.” Lab testing confirmed the strips contained buprenorphine (Suboxone), a Schedule III controlled substance, for which Tadgerson had no valid prescription. During an initial drug screen, Tadgerson tested positive for Suboxone, but a retest returned negative. Tadgerson was charged with being a prisoner in possession of a controlled substance (PPCS) under MCL 800.281(4).

4. The Parties’ Specific Legal Arguments

Prosecution’s Arguments:

• PPCS is a strict-liability offense, relying on People v. Ramsdell (1998)
• MCL 800.281(4) plainly imposes strict liability because it lacks any mens rea language
• The Legislature intended strict liability when it omitted mental state requirements that appear in other statutes
• MCL 8.9 should not apply because the statute “plainly imposes strict liability”

Defense Arguments:

• MCL 8.9 applies to the offense, requiring the prosecution to prove defendant knowingly possessed the Suboxone
• A bindover was inappropriate because the prosecution failed to prove knowing possession when the strips were placed in his cell by another prisoner
• For possessory offenses like PPCS, the applicable mental state should be “knowledge”

5. The Law of the Case

Primary Statutes:

MCL 800.281(4): “A prisoner shall not possess any alcoholic liquor, prescription drug, poison, or controlled substance.”

MCL 8.9 (enacted 2015): Imposes culpability requirements for criminal statutes that:

• Are not excluded by MCL 8.9(7)
• Are not plainly strict-liability offenses
• Do not specify mens rea in the statutory language

Key provisions of MCL 8.9:

• MCL 8.9(2): Culpability not required only when statutory language “plainly imposes strict criminal liability”
• MCL 8.9(3): If statutory language neither specifies culpability nor plainly imposes strict liability, the offense requires “intent, knowledge, or recklessness”
• MCL 8.9(9): “The mere absence of a specified state of mind” shall not be construed to mean the legislature intended no mental state requirement

Relevant Case Law:

• People v. Ramsdell (1998): Held PPCS was strict liability based on absence of mens rea language
• People v. Tombs (2005): Recognized presumption against strict liability absent clear legislative intent

6. The Majority Opinion’s Reasoning

Step 1: MCL 800.281(4) Does Not “Plainly Impose” Strict Liability

• The Court rejected the Ramsdell reasoning, which relied on the “mere absence” of mental state language
• MCL 8.9(9) expressly prohibits construing “mere absence” of specified mental state as legislative intent to eliminate mens rea requirements
• The enactment of MCL 8.9 in 2015 (years after Ramsdell) changed the analysis

Step 2: Legislative Intent Behind MCL 8.9

• Both the plain language and legislative history show the Legislature intended to “greatly reduce the number of strict-liability offenses”
• MCL 8.9 was enacted for efficiency—to impose general mens rea requirements rather than amending individual statutes
• The prosecution’s argument about MCL 800.281(4)’s original legislative intent fails because “the act of one legislative body does not tie the hands of future legislatures”

Step 3: Interpretation of “Plainly Imposes”

• The Court consulted dictionary definitions: “plain” means “without obscurity or ambiguity” and “impose” means “to establish by authority”
• Courts must look for “clear indications” that the Legislature intended strict liability
• If “plainly imposes” simply codified pre-existing standards, it would render MCL 8.9 “nugatory” because the exception would “swallow the rule”

Step 4: Application of MCL 8.9(3)

• Since MCL 800.281(4) neither specifies culpability nor plainly imposes strict liability, MCL 8.9(3) applies
• MCL 8.9(3) requires proof of “intent, knowledge, or recklessness”
• The Court rejected defendant’s argument for a “knowledge” standard, noting MCL 8.9 uses the disjunctive “or”
• The prosecution must prove “at a minimum” that defendant acted with recklessness (the least burdensome of the three standards)

7. Significance of the Majority Opinion

Legal Holding:

MCL 800.281(4) does not plainly impose strict liability; therefore, MCL 8.9(3) applies, requiring prosecution to prove the defendant acted with intent, knowledge, or recklessness.

Broader Implications:

• Dramatically restricts when courts can find statutes impose strict liability
• Requires clear statutory language, not mere silence, to establish strict liability
• Establishes that recklessness is the default/minimum mental state under MCL 8.9(3)
• Demonstrates how later legislative enactments can supersede prior case law interpretations
• Reinforces the general disfavor toward strict-liability offenses in criminal law

8. Concurring and Dissenting Opinions

Dissenting Opinion: Justice Brian K. Zahra

Rationale: Justice Zahra argued that MCL 800.281(4) plainly imposes strict liability for several reasons:

1. Contextual Analysis: The majority’s application of MCL 8.9(9) was “unduly narrow” because it ignored that MCL 800.281(2) contains an express mens rea element while subsection (4) does not
2. Legislative Intent Indicators: When a legislature includes particular language in one section but omits it from another, it “generally acts intentionally and purposely” in the disparate treatment
3. Nature of the Offense: MCL 800.281(4) prohibits only actual possession (not indirect possession like other subsections), making it more straightforward and appropriate for strict liability
4. Prison Context: Imposing stricter standards on prisoners than the general population is “sensible” given the “controlled, but often volatile, environment of a state prison”
5. Interpretation of “Plainly Imposes”: The majority’s interpretation was “overly broad” and effectively requires the Legislature to “affirmatively and expressly state that an offense has no mens rea requirement.” Zahra argued the phrase should incorporate existing caselaw principles for determining strict liability

Note on Participation:

Justice Noah P. Hood did not participate because the Court considered this case before he assumed office.

9. Case Disposition

Reversed and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. The Court did not retain jurisdiction.

Reasoning for Remand: Because defendant entered a no-contest plea based on the trial court’s erroneous conclusion that PPCS was a strict-liability offense, the case must return to the trial court for proceedings that account for the newly required mens rea element.