On October 8, 2025, the Michigan Supreme Court will hear oral argument as it considers whether it should keep Michigan’s status-based duty classifications for premises liability actions (licensee, invitee, or trespasser) or adopt an across-the-board reasonableness standard of care in line with the Third Restatement of Torts.

Michigan	2 Restatement Torts, 3d, § 51
Invitee   Who: Individuals invited to the property for the owner’s commercial benefit, such as customers in a store or someone conducting business with the owner. Property owner’s duty of care: The highest duty. Property owners must exercise reasonable care, regularly inspect their property for hazards, fix them, or warn invitees of known dangers. Owners are expected to anticipate harm and take steps to prevent injury—even from conditions that are considered “open and obvious”.	Subject to § 52, a land possessor owes a duty of reasonable care to entrants on the land with regard to:   (a) conduct by the land possessor that creates risks to entrants on the land;   (b) artificial conditions on the land that pose risks to entrants on the land;   (c) natural conditions on the land that pose risks to entrants on the land; and   (d) other risks to entrants on the land when any of the affirmative duties provided in Chapter 7 is applicable.
Licensee        Who: People who enter the property for their own purposes but have the owner’s express or implied permission—often social guests or friends.        Property owner’s duty of care: Property owners must warn licensees of known dangers that the licensee is unlikely to discover on their own. There is no obligation to inspect for unknown dangers or fix hazards for licensees.
Trespasser        Who: Individuals who enter the property without any legal right or the owner’s permission.        Property owner’s duty of care: The lowest duty. Owners are ordinarily only required to refrain from willful or wanton misconduct that would cause injury to trespassers. Liability may apply if a property owner intentionally creates a dangerous condition for the purpose of harming trespassers.

Case background

In the case that will be argued, Linda Molitoris v Saint Mary Magdalen Catholic Church (Docket No. 166699), Molitoris volunteered at a church event, slipped on black ice, and fell as she stepped off the sidewalk and into the parking lot in the early evening on February 22, 2021. Because of her injuries, she sued the church alleging ordinary negligence and premises liability. Molitoris later dismissed the ordinary negligence claim. Molitoris was a “licensee” under current Michigan premises liability caselaw.

During her 2022 deposition, Molitoris testified about what happened and the treatment and care that followed.

The trial court granted summary disposition in favor of the church because Molitoris was a “licensee” and not an “invitee”. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed.

Even so, former Court of Appeals Chief Judge Gleicher’s partial concurring and dissenting opinion called the Molitoris case a poster child for jettisoning Michigan’s continued use of status distinctions and urged “the Supreme Court to reconsider Stitt and to join the modern world of premises liability.”

Under current Michigan law, the church owed Molitoris no duty to even try to make the parking lot safe for her and her fellow volunteer meal-preparers [licensees]. Yet had Molitoris slipped and fallen on black ice in the parking lot of the Marco’s Pizza restaurant just down the road [as an invitee], a jury would decide whether the premises owner was liable for failing to remove or to warn of the danger. And had the victim of the church’s black ice been a farmer selling vegetables to the church [as an invitee] for use in the meals that Molitoris was preparing, the church would be liable for the farmer’s injuries. Perhaps the moral of this story is that under Michigan’s current premises liability law, no good deed goes unpunished.

Questions briefed to the Michigan Supreme Court:

(1) whether this Court should adopt the Third Restatement of Torts’ reasonable-care standard in lieu of traditional status-based categories to determine a premises possessor’s duty to persons who suffer physical harm caused by a condition on the land, Stitt v Holland Abundant Life Fellowship, 462 Mich 591 (2000); see also Kandil-Elsayed v F & E Oil, Inc, 512 Mich 95, 143-144 (2023); and

(2) whether adopting the Third Restatement’s reasonable-care standard, and thus overruling Stitt, 462 Mich at 591, comports with the doctrine of stare decisis, see Robinson v City of Detroit, 462 Mich 439 (2000).

September 5, 2025 update:

While Molitoris v St. Mary Magdalen Catholic Church (Docket No. 166699) remains pending on appeal, the Michigan Supreme Court has abeyed the application for leave to appeal in the icy church parking lot property personal injury cases Mead v Life Purpose Christian Church and Bernadette’s Faith in Action (Docket No. 168556) and Mead v Life Purpose Christian Church and Bernadette’s Faith in Action (Docket No. 168557).

The Court of Appeals decided both Mead matters in an April 14, 2025 unpublished per curiam opinion. Agreeing with the Macomb County Circuit Court that Mead was a licensee on the church/non-profit property and the defendants met their limited duty of care, the COA opinion described the relevant background facts:

Defendants are separate organizations that jointly owned a property with a church building on it. LOP uses part of the building to hold worship services twice a week, and Bernadette’s uses the other part of the building to run a nonprofit charity. In the summer of 2021, Dale and Barry Brockert, the owners of Bernadette’s, placed a plastic shed on the parking lot to serve as a food pantry, where members of the public could donate food and clothes as well as take food and clothes as needed, free of charge. The shed had no floor of its own, so its “floor” was the asphalt parking lot on which the shed sat. The shed was otherwise fully enclosed. Bernadette’s placed a small heat lamp inside the shed in an attempt to keep the food from freezing during the winter. Bernadette’s had exclusive control of the shed and food-pantry program.

On February 4, 2022, plaintiff entered the property to donate food to the food pantry. Plaintiff entered the shed and placed his food on the shelves. When plaintiff turned to leave, he slipped on a patch of ice and fell. Though plaintiff noticed snow on the ground outside of the shed, he did not notice anything on the shed floor when he entered it. No one working for Bernadette’s or LOP had ever seen ice inside the shed or received complaints about ice inside the shed before plaintiff’s fall. Dale went inside the shed at least every other day and never saw ice.

Applying the facts developed through discovery to Michigan’s current licensee standards, the Mead Court of Appeals reasoned (emphasis added):

Nothing in the record indicates that LOP had actual knowledge of, or reason to know about, the ice in the shed—no one complained about ice inside the shed, no one reported that they slipped on ice before plaintiff’s fall, and there is no evidence that LOP had knowledge of water on the shed’s floor. LOP’s lack of knowledge is unsurprising given the evidence that LOP was not involved with the food pantry or shed. While LOP had a responsibility to maintain the parking lot on which the shed sat, that responsibility did not extend to the inside of the shed. Therefore, the trial court did not err by concluding there was no genuine issue of material fact that LOP did not know, and had no reason to know, about the ice inside the shed before plaintiff’s fall.

Turning to Bernadette’s, Dale testified that Bernadette’s was responsible for maintaining the inside of the shed. Dale went inside the shed at least every other day and never saw ice inside the shed until after plaintiff’s fall. Additionally, no one reported ice inside the shed before plaintiff’s fall. The foregoing demonstrates that Bernadette’s did not have actual knowledge of the ice before plaintiff’s fall.

Bernadette’s also had no reason to know about the ice before plaintiff’s fall. Dale inspected the shed the day after plaintiff’s fall and concluded that the ice formed after a pile of snow near the shed melted, leaked underneath the shed, and refroze overnight. The pictures of the ice corroborate Dale’s explanation, and plaintiff provided no other explanation. Dale believed that the shed was level when he assembled it, and Barry found nothing amiss with the area of asphalt where they placed the shed. This demonstrated that Bernadette’s did not have a reason to believe there was a gap under the sides of the shed that would allow water to pool underneath it.

Additionally, Dale did not see ice inside the shed before February 5, 2022, though the shed was in the parking lot during the preceding winter months. This also demonstrated that Bernadette’s did not have reason to know ice would form inside the shed. Further, Bernadette’s had a heat lamp inside the shed that made it less likely that ice would form inside the shed. Dale testified that he did not anticipate that ice could form inside the shed. No evidence in the record suggested that Bernadette’s knew or had reason to know about the ice inside the shed. Therefore, we conclude there was no genuine issue of material fact that Bernadette’s did not know or have reason to know about the ice inside the shed.